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Abstract 
According to theories of embodiment enacting a smile or a frown can positively or negatively 
influence one’s evaluations, even without awareness of one’s facial activity. While some 
previous studies found evidence for facial feedback effects, recent replication attempts could 
not confirm these findings. Are our decisions throughout the day amenable to the state of our 
facial muscles? We tested the effect of smiling and frowning on the evaluation of emotional 
sentences describing everyday situations. While most previous studies based their assessment 
of awareness on verbal debriefing interviews without explicitly defined criteria, we employed 
a written debriefing questionnaire in order to avoid potential bias when identifying participants’ 
awareness. Our results indicate that smiling/frowning increased/decreased sentence ratings 
only for participants aware of their expressions. This emphasizes the importance of more 
rigorous awareness tests in facial feedback studies. Our results support the view that facial 
feedback cannot necessarily influence us without conscious mediation. 
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1 Introduction 
Human beings constantly evaluate their surroundings to identify both beneficial opportunities 
and situations that might pose a potential threat. Theories of embodiment suggest that our 
evaluations are partly shaped by the states of our body (Barrett & Lindquist, 2008; Laird & 
Lacasse, 2013; Niedenthal, 2007). For example it has been suggested that afferent feedback  
from the tension in our emotion-relevant facial muscles can influence our processing of 
affective stimuli (McIntosh, 1996; Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989). Simply put, we might perceive 
our surroundings as more positive when smiling and more negative when frowning. This so-
called facial feedback theory was supported by some previous studies which found that people 
who are enacting smiles (as opposed to either frowning or being prevented from smiling) gave 
more positive ratings for stimuli like cartoons (Laird, 1974; Strack et al., 1988; Dzokoto, 
Wallace, Peters, & Bentsi-Enchill, 2014) facial expressions (Dimberg & Söderkvist, 2011) or 
short video clips (Davis, Senghas, & Ochsner, 2009; Soussignan, 2002). However, a recent 
replication project of several laboratory groups found no effect of facial expressions on the 
evaluation of cartoons, despite a sample size of altogether about 1.000 participants 
(Wagenmakers, Beek, Dijkhoff, & Gronau, 2016). Thus, there is currently a debate about the 
generalizability of earlier found facial feedback effects. Are our decisions throughout the day 
really amenable to the state of our facial muscles? The current experiment tests the effect of 
facial muscle activation (smiling and frowning) on the evaluation of sentences describing 
everyday situations. These situations were chosen to be either clearly positive/negative or 
ambiguous in their affective value, in order to see if facial influence is stronger in cases where 
the valence value of a situation is less determined. Since the facial feedback hypothesis 
proposes that the effect of facial activation does not depend on the conscious appreciation of 
one’s facial expressions, we compared the extent of facial feedback effects between 
participants with and without awareness of their emotional expressions. 
Previous studies employed the evaluation of short statements describing common life events 
as an approximation of everyday decision making, especially with respect to trait-related 
interpretation biases. It was found that people with high levels of trait anxiety (Hirsch & 
Mathews, 1997; Voncken, Bögels, & De Vries, 2003; Wenzel & Lystad, 2005) or diagnosed 
anxiety disorders (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991; Stopa & Clark, 2000) 
tend to interpret especially ambiguous statements as more negative. Some findings even 
suggest that such interpretation biases might help to maintain emotional disorders (Hayes, 
Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010; Murphy, Hirsch, Mathews, Smith, & Clark, 2007; Salemink, 
van den Hout, & Kindt, 2010; Stopa & Clark, 2000). While such maladaptive interpretative 
tendencies are often explained with respect to cognitive mechanisms (e.g. Behar, DiMarco, 
Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009; Clark, 2001; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), embodiment 
theories propose that body activity is important for affective processing (Barrett & Lindquist, 
2008; Winkielman, Niedenthal, Wielgosz, Eelen, & Kavanagh, 2015). The current study tests 
the possibility that manipulating participants’ facial muscle activation might influence the 
rating of verbal descriptions of events similar to those employed in experiments measuring 
pathologically-relevant interpretation biases. Since some theories of embodiment propose that 
bodily feedback might be especially relevant when making decisions under uncertainty 
(Bechara & Damasio, 2005), we test the effect of facial feedback on both clearly valenced and 
ambiguous descriptions. As the latter are less determined in their emotional value, one could 
suspect that any influence due to changes in facial expressions are stronger in this case. 
Investigating the role of facial feedback for the processing of affective sentences is also 
relevant for theories of languages processing. Embodiment accounts suggests that 
understanding a sentence might partially rely on bodily feedback related to its meaning 
(Barsalou, 1999; Buccino et al., 2005; Zwaan, 2004). In line with this view it has been found 
that selective suppression of facial feedback during the reading of emotional sentences (e.g. 
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blocking of smiles for positive statements) can lead to an increase in comprehension time 
(Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007), 
as well as EEG responses indicating increased processing effort (Davis, Winkielman, & 
Coulson, 2015). While these studies mainly measured the effect of facial activity on time and 
effort needed to comprehend emotional sentences, it is less clear if muscle tension affects the 
actual interpretative outcome as well. Davis et al. (2015) for example found no effect of facial 
feedback on subsequent ratings of target sentences. Since their procedure was optimized for 
EEG measurements during reading, the ratings were performed only after a delay of several 
seconds when emotion-relevant facial activation was not enacted anymore which might have 
diminished the effect on the ratings. Thus, the current study more directly tests the role of facial 
feedback on evaluative outcomes by ensuring that facial activation is present during both the 
reading and rating of emotional sentences. 
One important goal of the current study was to investigate the role of task-awareness for the 
facial feedback effect on evaluations. It has often been considered crucial for the interpretation 
of feedback effects if participants are aware that they currently perform emotional expressions 
(McIntosh, 1996; Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989). If facial actions could influence 
participants without them being aware of their expressions, then this would suggest that facial 
muscle tension can directly shape one’s interpretative tendencies via bodily afferent feedback. 
If such effects were only found for participants aware of their expressions, then such results 
might be explained either due to demand or expectancy effects, or due to the activation of 
expression-congruent associations in the participant (e.g., the instruction to perform a smile 
could function as a prime of the concept of happiness; Buck, 1980; Laird, 1974; Zajonc et al., 
1989). Thus, one challenge of facial feedback studies has been to demonstrate feedback effects 
in the absence of conscious knowledge about the emotional relevance of one’s current 
expressions. Note that this would still allow for participants to have conscious changes in their 
emotional states (e.g. they might be happier during smiling), as long as they are not aware that 
these changes are supposed to be elicited by their facial actions. Previous studies used non-
emotional cover-stories in order to avoid participants becoming aware of the emotional 
relevance of their expressions. Facial feedback effects were found after the exclusion of task-
aware participants in most previously published reports (e.g. Dimberg & Söderkvist, 2011; Ito, 
Chiao, Devine, Lorig, & Cacioppo, 2006; Strack et al., 1988), but not all of them (Reisenzein 
& Studtmann, 2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2016). Given the relevance of awareness for 
understanding such findings, it is important to consider how task awareness should be assessed. 
Almost all facial feedback studies report using a verbal debriefing interview in order to measure 
participants’ task awareness. However, research on experiment compliance suggests that 
participants are less likely to admit experiment-relevant knowledge in verbal as compared to 
questionnaire-based debriefings (Newberry, 1973).  Most publications concerning facial 
feedback do not report a standardized, pre-defined set of debriefing questions or state explicit 
criteria for classifying the answers as showing task awareness. This make it hard for other 
researchers to critically evaluate the claims of researchers concerning the awareness of their 
participants. Importantly, debriefings interviews are themselves susceptible to demand effect 
(Orne, 1962), both on the side of the experimenter (who might be implicitly biased in wanting 
to succeed with the cover story), and the participant (who can be reluctant to contradict the 
‘authoritative’ cover story in a direct conversation; Blackhart, Brown, Clark, Pierce, & Shell, 
2012). As a possible improvement in this respect, Davis et al., (2009) and Soussignan (2004) 
used a written debriefing questionnaire and explicit criteria for identifying task-aware 
participants. While these studies excluded task-aware participants from their analysis, the 
current study employs this approach for a direct comparison of aware and unware participants. 
This will clarify how far any effect of facial feedback on verbal statements might depend on 
participants’ conscious knowledge about their facial expressions. As the approach for 
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identifying aware participants can vary considerably between studies, probing the role of task 
awareness might be an important step in explaining the divergent in study results concerning 
facial feedback. 
Overall, the current study assessed the effect of smiling, frowning or (as a control) no specific 
facial movements on the affective evaluations of a range of statements involving everyday 
situations that were either positive, negative or ambiguous in their emotional valence. The main 
dependent variable of interest where participants’ ratings of these situations while performing 
the intended facial expressions. In order to ensure that the emotional muscles were selectively 
activated during the ratings, we also measured facial muscle activation of the corrugator 
supercilii (‘frowning’) and the zygomaticus major (‘smiling’) muscle via electromyography 
(EMG; Tassinary, Cacioppo, & Vanman, 2000). We motivated the facial movements with a 
non-emotional cover story, but a structured debriefing questionnaire was employed that would 
allow comparison of effects in aware and unaware participants participants. The facial feedback 
hypothesis predicts that smiling/frowning leads to a more positive/negative evaluation of the 
situations irrespective of whether they are aware of that feedback. As the meaning of 
ambiguous situations should be more amenable to contextual influences, the effect could be 
expected to be more pronounced here. The comparison of task-aware und task-unaware 
participants allows to determine if any effect of facial feedback on sentence evaluations is 
dependent on a conscious mediation such as expectancy effects or activation of emotion-
congruent associations. 
 
2 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 121 undergraduate students (93 female) from Sussex University, taking part 
for course credit or financial reimbursement of £5. Mean age was 19.97 (SD = 2.88). 
 
Materials 
An initial set of 50 sentences describing either positive, negative, or ambiguous situations were 
created. In a pilot study, 32 participants rated the valence of each sentence on a 9-point-scale 
ranging from -4 (negative) to +4 (positive). Based on these ratings, we chose 9 clearly positive 
situations (each with a mean rating greater than 2, overall M = 3.66, SD = 0.13; e.g. “I’ve had 
a really productive day and am looking forward to a relaxing evening.”), 9 clearly negative 
sentences (each with a mean rating less than -2, M = -3.69, SD = 0.44; e.g. “I have so much 
work already and now I hear we have another test next week.”), and 9 ambiguous sentences 
(each having a mean rating between -1 and +1, M = 0.20, SD = 0.44; e.g. “The person from the 
other table looked over to me again and again”). 
 
2.2 Procedure 
Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to investigate how the activation 
of different muscle groups around the eyes might influence reading speed (cf. Topolinski & 
Strack, 2009, Experiment 4). For this reason they would be expected to perform reading tasks 
while contracting either muscle groups directly above or under the eye. Initially, they were 
instructed to lower the eyebrows whenever the message above eye would be shown on the 
screen, and raise the cheeks upwards and outwards as much as possible following the message 
below eye. These instructions had been identified in piloting trials as leading to typical 
frowning and smiling movements respectively. Note that in accordance with previous studies 
(e.g. Dimberg & Söderkvist, 2011) frowning in our experiment refers to a movement of the 
brows only. Our instructions for smiling did not include any direct mention of the lips, as 
referring to a body part directly under the eyes was more consistent with our cover story. In a 
short training phase participants practiced the movements while fixating a cross in the middle 
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of the screen (presented to them as a baseline measurement). The experimenter corrected 
participants’ movements when necessary until participants produced the desired expressions. 
Participants were told to hold their muscle movements until they received new instructions on 
the screen, and not to make any of the two movements when the message neither was shown. 
The main phase of the experiment consisted of three blocks. In each block all of the 27 
situations were presented once, with an equal number of each type assigned to one of the three 
movement instructions. The initial assignment of movements to situation was randomized and 
counterbalanced between the blocks, i.e. each sentence was rated once under each of the three 
facial movement conditions. Each trial started with the display of a movement instruction 
(above eye, below eye or neither) for one second, followed by the presentation of one of the 
situations. After three seconds a straight line with the two anchors negative and positive 
appeared below the sentences, functioning as a continuous rating scale from -420 to +420. 
Participants used the mouse to select a position on this scale reflecting their evaluation of the 
situation described. They were told that these ratings were necessary in order to ensure that 
they truly processed the meaning of each sentence. In order to make sure that participants would 
not memorize specific evaluation decisions, they did not receive any numerical feedback about 
their rating. After each trial the instruction neither appeared and a three-second pause followed 
to allow for the relaxation of the facial muscles. Thus, participants performed the facial 
movements during both the reading and the rating of each situation. Additionally, the 
experiment contained 15 distractor trials per block, during which instead of a sentence a 
random letter combination and a moving dot (ostensibly representing a typical reading pattern) 
were displayed. Participants were instructed to follow this dot with their eyes. While they were 
told that this was meant to identify effects of muscle activation during non-semantic 
processing, these trials only functioned to reinforce the cover story, and had no relevance for 
the main task. 
In order to evaluate participants’ awareness that their facial muscle activation was related to 
emotional expressions, two approaches were tested: An open-response task, were participants 
had to formulate the study purpose in their own words, and a prompted awareness task which 
asked participants to select applicable study purposes from a list of possibilities. More 
specifically, a two-page debriefing questionnaire was administered after the main task. On the 
first page, participants were instructed to write down what they believed to have been the 
purpose of the experiment.  No further instructions were given and no upper or lower limit for 
the length of the answer was indicated. The second page of the questionnaire included a 
prompted awareness task including descriptions of 13 items that may or may not be relevant to 
experiment. Some of these items related to the cover story of the current study (e.g. “the pattern 
of your eye movements”), some described aspects neither relevant to the cover story or the 
actual study purpose (e.g. “your gender”), and, importantly two target items were directly 
relevant to the true goal of the experiment (“the emotions related to your facial expressions” 
and “your mood”). Participants were asked to mark all the items on the list that they believed 
to be relevant to the experiment. An indication of awareness during an open response might be 
seen as a stricter criterion of awareness, since here the participant has to formulate the study 
purpose on her own. Choosing the actual purpose from a given list can be seen as a more liberal 
criterion (since reading the actual purpose after the experiment might actually trigger 
awareness), but could potentially have the benefit of identifying aware participants that were 
unwilling or unable to formulate the study purpose on their own. 
 
2.3 EMG Measurements 
Two pairs of 4mm Ag-AgCl electrodes were used for recording EMG activity from the 
corrugator and zygomaticus muscles.  Electrode placement followed the recommendations of  
Fridlund & Cacioppo (1986). The signal was recorded by a Biopac Mp36 measurement unit at 
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a sample rate of 2000 Hz. A low pass filter of 500 Hz was employed to attenuate noise artefacts. 
The signal was further treated to a moving-average integrator with a window size of 100 
samples. 
For each trial the mean EMG activation of the three second display of the sentence was 
calculated and the mean value of one second directly before trial onset (i.e. before the 
movement instruction appeared) was subtracted from this value. The resulting values were 
transformed to z-scores. 
 
3 Results 
3.1 Assessment of Task-Awareness 
First the free response section of the debriefing questionnaire was evaluated. Participants were 
classified as task-aware if any mention was made of a) facial movements in the task being 
related to emotional expressions, b) the expressions being intended to or actually influencing 
affective states, or c) the expressions being intended to or actually influencing the sentence 
ratings. Following these criteria fifty-four participants were considered to be task-aware. 
Secondly, participants’ responses to the list of possible study purposes was assessed. Here they 
were classified as showing ‘prompted awareness’ if they indicated that either of the true 
purposes of the study were relevant. Twenty-six participants showed only prompted awareness, 
i.e. they did not indicate any signs of awareness in their text but when subsequently presented 
with a list of possible study purposes checked at least one of the relevant target items. Forty-
one participants neither indicated task-awareness in their written statements nor on the 
subsequent checkbox list and hence where considered clearly task-unaware. 
 
3.2 Manipulation Check 
EMG data was used to test the success of the movement instructions in generating appropriate 
facial muscle activation (s. Figure 1). We also evaluated the possibility that a difference in task 
awareness might have led to different degrees of muscle movements. For both the corrugator 
and the zygomaticus, we conducted separate 2-way mixed ANOVAs with the within factor 
instruction (above eye/below eye/neither) and the between factor awareness level (no 
awareness/prompted awareness/full awareness). Here and in the subsequent analyses, 
Bonferroni corrections were used for post-hoc tests. For both muscles we observed a main 
effect of instruction, zygomaticus: F(2, 236) = 1107.43, p < .001, 2p  = .90, corrugator: F(2, 
236) = 2969.50, p < .001, 2p  = .96. In both cases there was no main effect of awareness level, 
zygomaticus: F(1, 118) = 0.16, p = .85, 2p  < .01, corrugator: F(1, 118) = 1.84, p = .16, 
2
p  = 
.03, nor an instruction*awareness interaction, zygomaticus: F(4, 236) = 0.71, p = .59, 2p  = .01, 
corrugator: F(2, 236) = 0.37, p = .82, 2p  = .01. This indicates that the instructions lead to 
different degrees in smiling and frowning with no difference in their effect between unaware 
and aware participants. The below eye instruction lead to significantly more zygomaticus 
activity than the neither instruction, t(120) = 38.00, p < .001, d = 3.45, and the above eye 
instruction, , t(120)= 33.91, p < .001, d = 3.08. There was also less zygomaticus activity in the 
neither than in the above eye condition, t(120)= -5.13, p < .001, d = 0.47. This might be an 
indication that the neither instruction lead to an overall relaxation of the face. Importantly, the 
change of in zygomaticus activity to from baseline was negative in both above eye and neither 
condition, and only positive after the below eye instruction (cf. Figure 1).  For the corrugator, 
the above eye instruction lead to significantly more activity than the neither instruction, t(120)= 
66.10, p < .001, d = 6.01, and the below eye instruction, t(120)= 68.98, p < .001, d = 6.27, 
which did not significantly differ from each other, t(120)= -1.06, p > .99, d = -0.10. Thus, the 
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movement instructions selectively increased smiling in the below eye condition and frowning 
in the above eye condition. 
 
3.3 Effects of Facial Expressions on Sentence Ratings 
Sentence ratings were z-transformed separately for each participant (see Table 1). A 3-way 
expression (smiling/frowning/neither) x situation type (negative/positive/ambiguous) x 
awareness level (unaware/prompted awareness/clearly aware) mixed ANOVA was conducted 
on the ratings. This revealed a main effect of situation, F(2, 236) = 3474.87, p < .001, 2p  = 
.97, expression, F(2, 236) = 6.75, p = .01, 2p  = .05, but no main effect of awareness, F(2, 118) 
< .001, p > .90, 2p  < .001. There was a situation*expression interaction, F(4, 472) = 3.20, p = 
.01, 2p  = .03, an awareness*expression interaction, F(4, 118) = 9.42, p < .001, 
2
p  = .14, but 
no situation*awareness interaction, F(4, 118) = 0.64, p = .63, 2p  = .01. All of these effects 
were qualified by a situation*expression*awareness interaction, F(8, 472) = 3.15, p = .002, 2p  
= .05. These results indicate a difference in the effects between participants of different 
awareness levels. Thus, for each awareness level a 2-way expression 
(smiling/frowning/neither) x situation type (negative/positive/ambiguous) within ANOVA was 
conducted. There was a main effect of situation for all groups, unaware: F(2, 80) = 786.16, p 
< .001, 2p  = .95, prompted awareness: F(2, 50) = 952.18, p < .001, 
2
p  = .97, clearly aware: 
F(2, 106) = 2893.67, p < .001, 2p  = .98. For both the clearly unaware and prompted awareness 
group there was neither a main effect of expression, clearly unaware: F(2, 80) = 0.37, p = .69, 
2
p  = .01, prompted: F(2, 50) = 1.22, p = .31, 
2
p  = .05, nor an expression*situation interaction, 
clearly unaware: F(4, 160) = 1.23, p = .30, 2p  = .03, prompted: F(2, 100) = 0.72, p = .58, 
2
p  
= .03. For clearly aware participants, there was a main effect of expression, F(2, 106) = 17.30, 
p < .001, 2p  = .25, as well as an expression*situation interaction, F(4, 212) = 8.89, p < .001, 
2
p  = .14. Thus, in all awareness classes the ratings depended on the type of situation, but only 
for clearly aware participants the rating depended on the expression performed during the 
evaluation. In all classes, ratings were significantly higher for positive situations than 
ambiguous and negative ones, and lower for negative than ambiguous situations (all p’s <.01, 
s. Table 1 for means and standard deviations). For the clearly aware group only, smiling lead 
to higher ratings than no expression t(53)= 3.73, p < .001, d = 0.51 and frowning, t(53)= 4.36, 
p < .001, d = 0.59. Frowning lead to lower ratings than no expression, t(53)= -3.93, p < .001, d 
= 0.53. The expression*situation interaction suggested that for some situation types the effect 
of the expression might have been stronger. In order to be able to compare the degree of 
influence in ratings produced through different expressions in the aware participants, we 
calculated for each situation type a change score by subtracting rating during frowning from 
the ones during smiling. The higher this score, the more amenable to facial feedback a sentence 
type could be considered. Difference scores for ambiguous situations (m = 0.23, SD = .38) 
were significantly higher than for positive situations (m = 0.08, SD = .22), t(53) = 3.95, p < 
.001, d = 0.54, or negative ones (m = 0.11, SD = .19), t(53) = 3.41, p = .004, d = 0.46), with no 
difference between the latter two, t(53)= -1.40, p = .17, d = -0.19. Thus, while all sentences 
were influenced by the facial expressions, this effect seemed to have been most pronounced 
for descriptions of ambiguous situations. Overall, while in all groups ratings depended on the 
valence of the situation, facial feedback only had an influence for clearly aware participants. 
The influence here was strongest for ambiguous situations. Given that unaware participants did 
not show a facial feedback effect, it would be important to know if this result might be due to 
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lack of statistical power (i.e. the number of unaware participants being insufficient) or if it can 
be seen as positive evidence for the absence of an expression effect. We explored this question 
with a Bayes factor analysis (Dienes, 2014; Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Wagenmakers, 2007). A 
Bayes factor (BF) is a numerical value that can differentiate between positive evidence for a 
hypothesis (usually BF > 3, s. Jarosz & Wiley, 2014 for recommended interpretation 
thresholds), positive evidence against it (BF < 1/3) and not entirely conclusive data (due to a 
lack of statistical power, 1/3 < BF < 3). Since the prompted awareness group showed the same 
pattern of results as the clearly unaware group, suggesting that participants in this group were 
actually unaware during the experiment, both groups were considered to be unaware and hence 
included in this analysis. Using JASP (JASP Team, 2016), we calculated the Bayes factor 
testing the main effect of expression on the sentence ratings, as well as the Bayes factor for the 
inclusion of the expression*situation interaction (as compared to a model that only included 
the main effects). For both expression, BF = 0.171, and the expression*situation interaction, 
BF = 0.008, the resulting Bayes factors were relatively low. This suggest that our data provides 
evidence against an effect of expressions on the ratings. Thus, the absence of an expression 
influence in unaware participants is not likely to be due to a lack of statistical sensitivity, but 
provides positive evidence for the null hypothesis, i.e. that muscle activation failed to influence 
the situation evaluations. 
 
4 Discussion 
The current study tested the effect of emotional facial muscle activation (smiling and frowning) 
on the evaluation of sentences describing clearly positive/negative or ambiguous situations. 
We employed a written debriefing questionnaire with explicit criteria for probing how far any 
affect might depend on participants’ awareness of the emotional relevance of their facial 
movements. It was found that for participants with awareness, facial activation did influence 
the evaluation of the described situations, with ambiguous situations being influenced 
significantly stronger by facial activity. There was no effect for participants without awareness 
of their expressions. As there was no difference in muscle activation between unaware and 
aware participants, these results cannot be explained with a difference in task compliance 
between the groups. Additionally, Bayesian analysis of the data indicates that the number of 
unaware participants was large enough to interpret the results as positive evidence for a null 
effect, i.e. a higher number of unaware participants is not likely to have produced a different 
finding.  
Methodologically, these results demonstrate the importance of finding a reliable way to identify 
task-awareness in research concerning facial feedback. Only participants classified as aware 
based on their free-text answers showed an effect of facial actions on ratings.  Participants who 
only indicated awareness when directly presented with the true study purpose (i.e. prompted 
awareness) did not differ in their effect from clearly unaware participants, suggesting that this 
approach for identifying awareness can lead to an overestimation of aware participants because 
the answers here might represent participants’ post-experimental beliefs elicited by the 
mentioning of the actual purpose. One limitation of the current study is that the debriefing 
questionnaire does not explain why awareness of the emotional relevance of the expressions 
leads to a systematic change in ratings. One possibility would be that participants might have 
reacted to perceived experimental demand. It would also be conceivable that consciously 
considering one’s expression would lead to activation of conceptual assumptions about the 
relation between certain expressions and emotions (Barrett, 2006; Bem, 1972; Schnall & Laird, 
2003). Thus, the conscious identification of one’s expressions might function as a contextual 
prime, leading to a biased interpretation of the target situations. Future studies could try to 
distinguish between different possible cognitive mechanism that might mediate the relation 
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between task-awareness and the behavioural outcome, for example by assessing participants’ 
conceptual beliefs about the influence of expressions on their emotional states. 
Overall, several studies exist that report facial feedback effects in  as unaware identified 
participants, using a range of different experimental designs and outcome measures (e.g. 
Andréasson & Dimberg, 2008; Dimberg & Söderkvist, 2011; Ito et al., 2006; Strack et al., 
1988). This support the idea that facial muscle tension can causally influence our affective 
processing at least in some aspects even in the absence of awareness. However, a recent 
replication attempt of Strack et al. (1988) could not find an effect of facial actions on 
evaluations, despite a high overall sample size of about 1700 participants (Wagenmakers et al., 
2016). This suggests that further research is needed to establish the reliability of facial feedback 
effects. The current study extends these previous findings by demonstrating the considerable 
influence of task awareness on effects of facial manipulations. It is noteworthy that many 
feedback studies use verbal debriefing interviews with no explicit criteria for their 
classification (or sometimes report no awareness test for their cover story at all). Thus, there 
might be a risk of a bias for classifying aware as unaware participants in some studies. Our 
results suggests that such a bias, combined with the currently widely discussed tendency not to 
publish null results (Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Kühberger, Fritz, & Scherndl, 2014) might lead 
to an overestimation of the extent and intensity of  facial feedback effects. 
Note that our results do not imply a general rejection of the possibility of unconscious facial 
feedback effects. While previous studies finding facial feedback effects without awareness 
employed mainly pictorial stimuli (e.g. Davis et al., 2009; Dimberg & Söderkvist, 2011; 
Soussignan, 2004), we found no effect on ratings of verbal statements describing relatively 
common life events, corroborating a similar finding by Davis et al. (2015). Other studies 
investigating facial effects on emotional sentences did not directly measure evaluative 
outcomes, but found that selectively blocking smiling/frowning increased reading times of 
emotion-congruent sentences (Havas et al., 2010, 2007). The divergent results concerning the 
presence and absence of such effects might suggest that proponents of the facial feedback 
hypothesis would have to identify in more specific terms what kind of evaluative processes can 
be influenced by facial activation. For example, dual-process models of decision making often 
distinguish between intuitive (usually relatively quick) and analytical (usually more elaborated) 
decisions (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Some theories of embodiment 
suggest that bodily feedback might function as an additional heuristic for decisions where 
external information is not readily available, effectively allowing for intuitive ‘gut feeling’ 
decisions (Damasio, 1996; Sütterlin, Schulz, Stumpf, Pauli, & Vögele, 2013). On the other 
hand, language processing has sometimes been linked to more analytical processing (cf. Evans, 
2008; Sadler-Smith, 2011). It might be possible that the task to evaluate sentences in the current 
study lead to a more elaborated or analytical decision making approach in the participants than 
the evaluation of pictorial stimuli and thus made it more likely to base the ratings on cognitive 
strategies rather than facial feedback. The effect on reading times in earlier studies could be 
interpreted a trade-off between processing effort and amenability to facial feedback, e.g. maybe 
participants invest processing resources into tuning out potentially misleading bodily feedback 
in these cases. Future studies could address this distinction by contrasting the effect of facial 
muscle activation under conditions that encourage more or less elaborated decision making, 
e.g. by manipulating the time available for forming a judgment. It is also noteworthy, that some 
studies suggested that facial feedback effects might depend on interpersonal differences 
(Andréasson & Dimberg, 2008; Laird et al., 1994). Thus, it would be possible that people differ 
in their amenability towards bodily feedback. If that was the case, it would be important to 
specify the personality factors that determine the responsiveness towards afferent facial 
feedback. 
 Facial Feedback and Evaluations 11 
Overall, the current study is in line with a limited view of facial feedback effects, suggesting 
that facial feedback is not necessarily a determinant of evaluative outcomes (Reisenzein & 
Studtmann, 2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2016), which leaves open the possibility that its 
influence is relevant under special circumstances (cf. Davis et al., 2015; Maringer, Krumhuber, 
Fischer, & Niedenthal, 2011). Experimentally distinguishing between affect-related processes 
that are or are not dependent on bodily feedback such as the state of our facial muscles, will be 
necessary in order to further our understanding of the role of embodiment in our everyday life. 
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Table 1 
Mean (and standard deviations) of the ratings for different sentence types expressed as z-scores. 
 Clearly unaware 
(n = 41) 
Prompted awareness 
(n = 26) 
Clearly aware 
(n = 54) 
 Smile None Frown Smile None Frown Smile None Frown 
Positive 1.119 
(0.23) 
1.141 
(0.21) 
1.125 
(0.23) 
1.143 
(0.14) 
1.152 
(0.13) 
1.154 
(0.12) 
1.163 
(0.13) 
1.101 
(0.14) 
1.085 
(0.17) 
 
Ambiguous -0.019 
(0.21) 
-0.037 
(0.19) 
-0.052 
(0.20) 
-0.108 
(0.22) 
-0.056 
(0.22) 
-0.077 
(0.21) 
0.093 
(0.23) 
-0.011 
(0.17) 
-0.139 
(0.25) 
 
Negative -1.091 
(0.18) 
-1.090 
(0.28) 
-1.087 
(0.23) 
-1.068 
(0.11) 
-1.069 
(0.14) 
-1.070 
(0.14) 
-1.049 
(0.17) 
-1.087 
(0.14) 
-1.156 
(0.12) 
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Figure 1 
 
Changes in facial muscle tension (in z-scores) evoked by the movement instruction for 
zygomaticus (left) and corrugator (right). Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
